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Abstract. In April 2000 the Irish government introduced a national minimum
wage of IR£4.40 (€5.58) an hour. We use data from a specifically designed survey
of firms to estimate the employment effects of this change. Employment growth
among firms with low-wage workers prior to the legislation was no different from
that of firms not affected by the legislation. A more refined measure of the
minimum wage, however, suggests that the legislation may have had a negative
effect on employment for the small number of firms most severely affected by the
legislation. However, the size of these effects is relatively modest.
1. Introduction
While there is still debate on the effect of minimum wage laws on
employment, a growing number of studies have found effects that
are clustered around zero (Brown, 1999). Much of this research,
however, is based on either US studies (e.g. Card and Krueger, 1995,
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2000; Neumark and Wascher, 2000) or UK research (e.g. Dickens
et al., 1999; Machin and Manning, 1996; Machin et al., 2003;
Stewart, 2004). In this paper we provide additional empirical evi-
dence on the labour market effects of minimum wage legislation by
examining the introduction of a national minimum wage (NMW)
in Ireland in April 2000. Prior to April 2000, minimum wages in
Ireland were set by Joint Labour Committees (JLCs). However, the
wages specified in these agreements were often quite low and
covered less than a quarter of the workforce. Furthermore, the level
of enforcement was quite weak. On 1 April 2000 the Irish govern-
ment introduced a NMW of IR£4.40 (€5.58) per hour for all adult
workers aged 18 years or older.
In this paper we evaluate the impact of this legislation on wages
and employment using data collected from a new survey of firms
carried out before and after the introduction of the NMW. The
panel survey contains detailed information on the employment
structures and work practices of firms, as well as subjective ques-
tions relating to the company’s attitude towards minimum wage
laws. Our analysis suggests that the minimum wage legislation had
little effect on the probability of firms closing down. Furthermore,
employment growth among firms with low-wage workers prior to
the legislation was no different from that of firms not affected by
the law. However, these simple comparisons fail to take into
account the significant wage growth that occurred in Ireland during
this period. In some firms, low-wage workers would have experi-
enced a wage increase even in the absence of the legislation. When
we adjust our analysis to account for this we find lower employ-
ment growth within the small number of firms most severely
affected by the legislation. However, the implied elasticity of labour
demand is relatively small given the unskilled nature of the workers
involved.
2. The national minimum wage in Ireland: a new survey of firms
Between 1995 and 2000 real income in Ireland grew by approxi-
mately 10 per cent per year; the corresponding figure for the entire
EU was only 2.6 per cent. Over this same period the unemployment
rate in Ireland fell from 12.3 per cent to 4.3 per cent and average
hourly industrial earnings increased by 25 per cent. It was against
this background of substantial economic growth that the Minimum
Wage Commission was set up to oversee the introduction of a
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national minimum wage in Ireland. The Report of the National
Minimum Wage Commission (1998, pp. 59–60) recommended that:
The initial rate for the national minimum wage should be set 
at around two thirds of median earnings . . . [noting that] . . . in
today’s terms, two thirds of median earnings would represent
IR£4.40 per hour.
A separate rate for employees under 18 years of age, set at 70 per
cent of the full rate, was also recommended. By the time it was
introduced in April 2000 the minimum wage rate of IR£4.40 (€5.58)
corresponded to approximately half of the median wage rate.
To examine the consequences of this legislation on labour market
outcomes we conducted a new survey of Irish firms.1 During the
last quarter of 1998, 2,330 establishments were asked to complete
a questionnaire designed to collect details on current employment
size; employment structures by hourly pay rates; and the age, gender
and full- or part-time composition of their workforce in the 12
months preceding the survey. In the first instance, an owner or 
director of the company was contacted in relation to the survey. If
necessary they could pass the survey on to the individual with
responsibility for, and knowledge of, the employment structure of
the firm.2 Approximately 52 per cent of the questionnaires were
completed by an owner or director of the company; 37 per cent by
a human resources manager or equivalent; and only 11 per cent
were completed by lower grade staff. In total, 1,064 questionnaires
were completed successfully3 and the data provided describe the
work practices and employment structure of firms 12–14 months
prior to the introduction of the minimum wage.
A detailed description of these data is given in the Data appen-
dix. Tables A1–A7 summarize the characteristics of the workers and
firms within the sample. The Appendix also provides a detailed 
classification of minimum wage workers based on our initial survey.
Our survey did not collect individual wage data; rather, firms were
asked to classify workers according to the wage bands given in
Tables A1 and A2. At the time the legislation was proposed 21 per
cent of all private-sector employees in the survey were earning
IR£4.50 or less, with part-time workers over-represented among the
low paid. Table A2 provides a more detailed breakdown of the inci-
dence of low pay. The first column indicates that approximately 
13 per cent of private-sector employees were being paid between
IR£4.00 and IR£4.50 an hour, approximately 7 per cent received an
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hourly wage between IR£3.00 and IR£3.99, while only 1.5 per cent
of private-sector employees received an hourly wage of less than
IR£3.00. The second column shows the composition of the low paid
by wage category. We see that 60 per cent of those earning less than
IR£4.50 an hour had an hourly wage between IR£4.00 and IR£4.50.
Almost one-third earned between IR£3.00 and IR£4.00 an hour,
while only 7 per cent of low-paid workers earned less than IR£3.00
an hour.
The results in Tables A3–A6 are much as expected. Women
accounted for approximately 57 per cent of those below IR£4.50.
Since women represented a minority of all employees, this means
they faced a greater risk of being affected by the minimum wage
legislation. Over 80 per cent of those aged under 18 were below
IR£4.50. The percentage below this cut-off was still relatively high
for the 19–25 age group (approximately 34 per cent), but then fell
sharply to 11 per cent for older workers. Table A5 shows that three
occupations were particularly vulnerable to low pay: sales, personal
services, and labourers. In each of these occupations at least one-
third of workers were paid less than IR£4.50 an hour, with the figure
being as high as two-thirds in personal services. The first two of
these occupations accounted for 56 per cent of all low-paid em-
ployees, despite accounting for only 21 per cent of the total work-
force. Production operatives also accounted for a substantial
proportion of low-paid workers; however, the proportion of these
workers in the low-pay category was in line with their representa-
tion among all employees. Finally, Table A6 provides a breakdown
of low pay by industry. Several important features emerge from this
analysis. There were three sectors within which workers faced a rel-
atively high probability of being low paid; 33 per cent of all workers
in the textiles and apparel industries were paid less than IR£4.50 an
hour, with the corresponding figures in the retail sector and the
hotel, restaurant and bar sectors being 39 per cent and 50 per cent,
respectively. The final column of the table shows that between them
the latter two sectors accounted for 57 per cent of low-paid workers.
Workers in the textile and apparel sector made up a relatively small
proportion of those being paid less than IR£4.50 because they
accounted for only 2 per cent of the total number of employees.
In the last quarter of 2000 we conducted a follow-up survey of
these establishments in order to examine firm-level responses to the
minimum wage. Attempts were made to contact each of the firms
in the original survey. As well as these firms, a number of additional
firms were also surveyed. In total, 1,045 firms responded to the
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second survey, of which 587 contained employment and wage data
from both surveys.4 In addition, we identified 50 firms that had gone
out of business by the time of the second sweep, bringing the total
number matched at the two surveys up to 637.5 Since the NMW was
introduced in April 2000, the data from the second survey reflect
employment structures approximately 6 months after the minimum
wage legislation was enacted. The matched firms are used to assess
the impact of the minimum wage on labour market variables.
Summary statistics for the full sample and the matched sample are
given in Table A7 of the Data appendix and are very similar across
both samples. We have also estimated a probit model for participa-
tion in the second survey. The p-value of the minimum wage vari-
able was 0.45. This suggests that, in the context of our minimum
wage analysis, attrition across waves can be viewed as random.
Thus, while non-response unfortunately reduces our sample sizes
and consequently the precision of our estimators, it is less likely to
bias our estimation procedure.
In designing the survey we have tried to carefully address criti-
cisms aimed at earlier ‘before-and-after’ studies of the US minimum
wage. It has been noted by a number of researchers (see, for
example, Brown, 1999, p. 2,132) that before-and-after comparisons
may be affected by the timing of these comparisons. It is quite
common for potential minimum wage legislation to be in the public
domain for some time prior to being passed. If this is the case 
then some firms, anticipating its introduction, may begin to make
gradual changes to their employment structure even before the 
legislation is enacted. Studies that use employment levels before the
minimum wage law is passed as the benchmark level of employment
may therefore have already missed some of the employment
response. To account for this we included a series of questions at
the end of the first survey examining the employers’ awareness of
the minimum wage and whether they had already taken steps to
prepare for a situation where a minimum wage operates. Although
80 per cent of firms reported having heard of the proposed
minimum wage, less than one-third knew the rate at which it was to
be introduced. Furthermore, only 29 per cent of these firms knew
the year it was to be introduced (20 per cent answered the wrong
year and the remaining 51 per cent said they did not know). Finally,
when asked whether their company had taken any steps to prepare
for the minimum wage, only 13 per cent of all firms said that they
had and most of these firms simply noted that they already paid
above the minimum wage. We obtained similar proportions when
Evaluating the Introduction of a National Minimum Wage 67
© 2006 The Authors
Journal compilation © CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
we restricted our sample to firms that had minimum wage workers
at the time of the first survey. Based on these data we are confident
that our first-wave data provide an appropriate pre-legislation
benchmark for the firms in our survey.
It has also been suggested that measurement error in the
employment data may distort the results from surveys of this kind.6
There are a number of reasons why we think this is less likely for
our data. Firstly, all our questionnaires were completed on a per-
sonally administered basis that involved an interviewer paying a
visit to each respondent and completing the instrument on site.
Secondly, while the employment data in our survey come from a
question asking ‘. . . the total number of persons currently engaged
in your company, on a full-time and part-time basis’, the respon-
dent was later asked to classify the staff on the basis of pay, age,
gender and occupation. At each stage the interviewer was instructed
to check that the totals from these classifications matched the
response to the initial employment question. Where inconsistencies
became apparent these were resolved by telephone follow-up with
the respondent. These consistency checks increase the reliability of
our employment data and reduce the likelihood of measurement
error. Finally, we attempted to ensure that the same individual filled
in the questionnaire in both waves of the survey.
To examine the issue of measurement error further we follow
Neumark and Wascher (2000). They argue that classical measure-
ment error that is uncorrelated over time should manifest itself
through a relatively low correlation in employment levels within
firms across the two waves of the data. They report a correlation of
0.52 using survey data compared with a correlation of 0.81 using
payroll data. Figure 1, shows a plot of wave 2 versus wave 1
employment for the matched firms in our sample. The estimated
correlation is 0.92, which is higher than either of the samples 
considered by Neumark and Wascher.7,8
3. Employment effects of the minimum wage
The first wave of our survey shows that approximately 50 per cent
of the firms sampled had at least one worker earning less than the
proposed minimum in the year prior to the introduction of the law.
As noted above, these workers constituted 21 per cent of all private-
sector employees in the firm survey, with approximately 13 per cent
of private-sector employees being paid between IR£4.00 and
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IR£4.50 an hour and approximately 8.5 per cent receiving an hourly
wage less than IR£3.99. The lack of individual wage data makes it
difficult to run wage regressions to establish the impact of the
minimum wage on firms’ wages. Nevertheless using the second wave
of our survey we can establish that by the end of 2000 only 24 per
cent of firms had at least one worker receiving IR£4.50 or less and
these workers constituted only 4 per cent of the employees in the
firm survey. Only approximately 1 per cent of all employees earned
less than IR£3.99 by the end of 2000. We also asked firms to indi-
cate the approximate percentage increase in their wage bill result-
ing directly from the legislation — 76 per cent of the firms that
responded stated that the legislation had no effect on their wage bill.
As expected, firms with a larger proportion of minimum wage
workers at the time of the legislation were significantly more likely
to cite increased labour costs. The average increase in labour costs
among the 24 per cent of affected firms was approximately 8.6 per
cent. This is a relatively large increase in wages and suggests that
for those firms that were affected, the minimum wage may have had
a significant bite.
In the second survey we also asked firms to respond to two ques-
tions related to wage spillovers higher up the wage distributions.
The questions were as follows:
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Figure 1. Employment correlation within firms across the two waves of
the survey
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Q.32 When the minimum wage was introduced did you have to
increase the hourly rates of higher grade staff to maintain pay
differentials?
Yes ❑1 No ❑2
Q.33 I would like you to think in terms of those workers who were
above the minimum wage when it was introduced. Approxi-
mately what percentage of your workforce which was above
the minimum wage received an increase in hourly pay rates as
a result of restoring pay differentials?
__________ per cent
In total, 18 per cent of firms acknowledged some spillover effects.
The extent of spillover among these firms was quite large: on
average, 50 per cent of the high-wage workers in these firms were
reported to have received wage increases in order to maintain pay
differentials. The international evidence on wage spillovers is mixed.
Teulings (2003) reports large spillover effects in the USA, with the
negative effect of minimum wage reductions affecting all wages up
to the average wage. Dickens and Manning (2004a, b), on the other
hand, found little evidence of spillovers arising from the introduc-
tion of the national minimum wage in the UK. Each of these studies
requires identifying assumptions on the evolution of the underlying
wage distribution. In contrast, our estimates are based on direct
responses of firms to questions concerning the degree of wage
spillover. Ignoring measurement, which may affect both types of
studies, our approach gives a more accurate measure of the number
of workers affected by spillovers. Unfortunately, we cannot use our
data to identify the contribution of spillovers to the overall wage 
distribution. We return to the issue of spillovers later in the paper.
To begin examining the employment effects of these wage
changes we look at firms that had gone out of business by the time
of the second survey. Although this is a rather extreme form of
employment change, the possibility that firms would be forced out
of business as a result of the legislation was presented as a real
threat by opponents of the minimum wage prior to its introduction.
To examine this possibility, Table 1 classifies firms according to their
business status at the end of 2000 and also according to their sales
and profit activity during 1998. Not surprisingly, we see that firms
that went out of business are over-represented among firms that
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experienced both sales and profit difficulties in the years before the
survey. However, of more interest to us is the extent to which the
closure decision was affected by the minimum wage legislation.
Table 2 classifies these firms according to the wage structure of their
employment force in 1998. These figures show that firms that had
gone out of business by the time of the second survey tended to be
disproportionately high-wage firms and are under-represented
among firms employing a large number of minimum wage workers.
This is not what one would expect if the minimum wage were
forcing firms to shut down. We have also estimated a probit model
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Table 1. Firms that participated in the 1998 survey cross-classified
according to the volume of their business/level of profits in the
12 months preceding the 1998 survey and business status in 2000
In business Out of business 
Trends in 1998 in 2000 (%) in 2000 (%) All firms (%)
Business volumes
Increased 55.01 31.85 53.34
Stayed the same 38.15 36.32 37.94
Decreased 6.84 31.83 9.72
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Profit levels
Substantial loss 0.15 14.27 1.78
Moderate loss 4.08 15.26 5.37
Broke even 21.01 31.38 22.21
Moderate profit 69.33 39.12 65.84
Substantial profit 5.43 0.0 4.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 2. Firms that participated in the 1998 survey cross-classified
according to the percentage of employees in 1998 who were
below an hourly basic pay of IR£4.50 (€5.71) and business
status in 2000
Percentage below IR£4.50 In business Out of business All firms
(€5.71) an hour in 1998 in 2000 (%) in 2000 (%) (%)
None 52.82 58.89 53.51
Less than 15% 4.95 1.1 4.51
15% or more 42.23 40 41.98
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
for the likelihood of going out of business which, as well as includ-
ing controls for wage structure and profit status, also controls for a
range of other firm characteristics. As expected, firms that were per-
forming poorly prior to the survey were significantly more likely to
close down. However, the estimated coefficient on the minimum
wage indicator was statistically insignificant ( p = 0.39). Our results
are consistent with those reported recently on the impact of the UK
NMW on care home closures (Machin and Wilson, 2004).
Although the minimum wage may not have resulted in many
firms going out of business it may still have caused employment
reductions among those firms that remained in business. On
average, employment in all firms increased by approximately 18 per
cent over this period;9 however, the median increase in employment
was only 3 per cent, and 30 per cent of the firms experienced a
decline in employment. To examine the employment effects of the
wage changes for these firms we relate employment growth over this
period to measures of the effective bite of the minimum wage. We
follow Machin et al. (2003) and estimate the following equation:
[1]
where %D(Nit) measures the percentage change in employment
between 1998 and 2000, MinW measures the effective bite of the
minimum wage and X is a vector of controls for observable firm
characteristics. To estimate this equation we needed to construct a
measure of MinW. Initially we use the proportion of the firm’s
labour force that was below the NMW prior to its introduction (we
denote this by PropLow98). The results of estimating equation [1],
using only this measure as a control, are given in the first column
of Table 3. We see that this measure of the minimum wage bite is
not significantly related to employment growth. This is consistent
with the findings of Card and Krueger (1995, 2000) and Machin
and Manning (1994, 1996).
In the above model, identification is achieved by comparing firms
with minimum wage workers with firms without these workers. It is
likely that these firms may have experienced different employment
patterns even without the legislation. Failure to control for these
differences could distort any minimum wage impact. Our surveys
allow us to identify some firm characteristics that may act as useful
control variables. The controls available include whether the firm
was Irish or foreign owned (Irish); whether the firm exported or not
(Export); an indicator of the profitability of the firm in the year
% ,,D N W X eit i t it it( ) = + + +- -b b b0 1 1 2 1Min
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prior to the minimum wage (Profit); an indicator variable denoting
whether or not at least 50 per cent of the firm’s non-managerial
employees were in a trade union (Union); as well as the percentage
of the company’s total operating costs that are accounted for by its
wage bill (Wage Bill). We also included the firm’s initial employ-
ment level (TotEmp98) as a regressor. Summary statistics for these
variables are given in the Appendix.10 The results from this specifi-
cation are given in column (2) of Table 3.11 Including the additional
controls has little effect on the minimum wage estimates; the
minimum wage effect is still small and insignificant.
An alternative way of achieving identification is to focus only on
firms with minimum wage workers and to use variations in the pro-
portion of the labour force below the minimum wage to identify the
effect for this sample. While this reduces the number of observa-
tions available, it should also reduce the unobserved heterogeneity
in the sample. The results from this exercise are given in Table 4.
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Table 3. The impact of minimum wages on employment (dependent
variable — percentage change in employment from 1998 
to 2000; White’s robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses)
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Constant 0.16** 0.27*
(0.04) (0.16)
PropLow98 0.0002 0.0002
(0.001) (0.001)
Irish -0.12
(0.10)
Export 0.007
(0.07)
Profit 0.10*
(0.06)
Union -0.02
(0.07)
Wage Bill -0.002
(0.002)
TotEmp98 -0.0001
(0.0001)
R2 — 0.016
Sample size 451 451
* Significant at the 10 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level.
Restricting the sample only to minimum wage firms makes little dif-
ference to our results; again, it appears as though the minimum
wage had little effect on employment growth.
While the results so far suggest that the minimum wage had little
effect on employment changes, we need to be careful in interpret-
ing these findings. We noted above that approximately 20 per cent
of Irish employees were receiving less than the minimum wage in
the year prior to the introduction of the NMW. In the analysis 
so far this group has formed the basis of our treatment group.
However, a criticism that has often been levelled at these types of
studies is their inability to distinguish between the potential and the
actual bite of the minimum wage (Deere et al., 1996). It is reason-
able to assume that some of the workers in receipt of wages below
the minimum wage in 1998 would have received a wage increase by
2000 in any case. It would not be surprising to find that the legis-
lation had little effect on these workers even though they are
recorded in our data as minimum wage workers. As noted above,
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Table 4. The impact of minimum wages on employment (minimum
wage firms only) (dependent variable — percentage changes in
employment from 1998 to 2000; White’s robust standard errors
appear in parentheses)
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Constant 0.13** 0.27
(0.08) (0.24)
PropLow98 0.0006 0.0008
(0.001) (0.002)
Irish -0.20*
(0.11)
Export -0.01
(0.08)
Profit 0.14**
(0.07)
Union 0.09
(0.10)
Wage Bill -0.001
(0.003)
TotEmp98 -0.0006**
(0.003)
R2 — 0.03
Sample size 230 230
* Significant at the 10 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level.
this is likely to be a serious issue in the Irish context. While
restrained wage growth was a notable feature of the Irish labour
market for much of the 1990s, the labour market tightened signifi-
cantly in the late 1990s. Employment grew by over 6 per cent in 1999
and the unemployment rate fell below 5 per cent. This growth con-
tinued in 2000 with an additional 75,000 people in work that year.
The rise in employment was accompanied by a marked decline in
unemployment and long-term unemployment: the long-term unem-
ployment rate more than halved since the beginning of 1998, reach-
ing just 1.7 per cent by the first quarter of 2000.
Evidence on earnings trends across a broad range of occupations
and sectors shows that wage inflation began to accelerate signifi-
cantly from 1997 onwards. Of particular concern in this study is the
growth rate in wages between the last quarter of 1998, when our
first survey was conducted, and April 2000, when the minimum
wage was introduced. Data on industrial earnings indicate that
average hourly earnings increased by 8.5 per cent over this period.
The average hourly earnings of unskilled and semi-skilled opera-
tives, in the construction industry, increased by over 15 per cent. In
the services sector, average weekly earnings over this same period
were up 18 per cent in distribution; 24 per cent in the retail trade;
and 12 per cent in the business services sector. Given these circum-
stances, it seems reasonable that the 50 per cent of firms identified
as having a minimum wage worker in the 1998 survey overestimates
the actual number of firms affected by the legislation.
To account for the natural growth in wages we asked firms
affected by the minimum wage the following question:
Q.31 Given trends in the labour market in Ireland over the last year,
do you think that you would have had to increase wage rates
anyway up to the minimum level set out in the minimum wage?
Of the second-wave firms that reported having minimum wage
workers at the time the law was introduced, 84 per cent said that
they would have increased wages in any case. This is in keeping with
the rapid economy-wide increases in wages outlined in the earlier
paragraph. To allow for this in our analysis we create a new
minimum wage variable (EffectiveMW). This takes the value 1 only
if the firm reported in 2001 that it had workers affected by the 
legislation and would not have increased wages were it not for the
legislation. Using these criteria, only 4 per cent of firms (38 firms)
were actually directly affected by the minimum wage legislation.
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One immediate concern that arises in this context is whether it is
plausible that only 4 per cent of firms were directly affected by the
legislation. While it is difficult to address this issue directly with our
data, we can get some idea of the likely magnitudes involved by
combining our estimates for average wage growth over this period
with information on the extent to which wages in these firms fell
below the minimum. We noted above that average wage growth of
unskilled and semi-skilled workers ranged between 15 per cent and
24 per cent over this period. With this wage growth, say 20 per cent
on average, workers who had been earning IR£3.66 in the first
survey would have had their wage exceed the minimum by the time
of the legislation. Although our survey does not contain individual
data on wages, it does allow us to classify low-wage workers into
three categories: those initially earning between IR£4.00 and
IR£4.50; those earning between IR£3.00 and IR£4.00; and those
earning less than IR£3.00. Given the above wage growth, it seems
very likely that any worker in the first category in 1998 would no
longer be classified as a minimum wage worker in 2001. Of the 50
per cent of firms that initially reported having workers in the
minimum wage category, almost half had workers in the first cate-
gory only. Excluding these firms from the minimum wage group
reduces the proportion of firms affected from 50 per cent to 28 per
cent. However, even this figure is likely to overstate the number of
firms affected, since in some of the remaining firms the vast ma-
jority of workers, though not all, were in the IR£4.00–4.50 category.
It may also be reasonable to assume that a significant proportion
of workers originally receiving between IR£3.00 and IR£4.00 would
also have had their wages rise to above the minimum wage. If we
make the stronger assumption that only workers that were initially
in the lowest wage category (less than IR£3.00 an hour) would have
been affected when the legislation was introduced, then the pro-
portion of firms affected falls to 8.7 per cent. Thus while our new
effective minimum wage measure may understate the proportion 
of firms affected by the legislation, it is likely to provide a more
plausible measure of those affected than the initial uncorrected 
proportion.
To gain a better understanding of the nature of these affected
firms, Panel A of Table 5 summarizes average and median employ-
ment levels in each of three groups for both 1998 and 2000. The
first column refers to the entire sample, the second refers to those
firms that had minimum wage workers in 1998 (the basis for the
earlier estimates) and the third column refers to those firms that
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Table 5. Characteristics of firms classified by exposure to the minimum wage legislation (standard errors appear in
parentheses)
Firms with minimum Firms constrained by
wage workers in first the legislation
Variable All firms sweep (PropLow98 > 0) (EffectiveMW)
Panel A
Average employment levels in 1998 66 58 90
Average employment level in 2000 82 64 94
Median employment levels in 1998 20 25 17
Median employment levels in 2000 22 28 17
Panel B
Average proportion of firms with some workers 28% 56% 43%
earning less than IR£4.00 (€5.08) in 1998
Average number of workers per firm affected 4 7.3 14.3
by the legislation in 2000 (0.58) (1.3) (3.8)
Average proportion of workers per firm at 0.06 0.10 0.24
IR£4.50 (€5.71) after legislation (0.005) (0.01) (0.05)
Average percentage increase in wage bill as a 1.99% 3.7% 10.11%
result of legislation (0.16) (0.39) (1.54)
Proportion of firms affected by wage spilloversa 17.51% 29.19% 47.37%
Average proportion of workers per firm affected 54.45% 54.14% 62.90%
by wage spillovers (affected firms only)a
Notes: a The spillover calculations are based on firms’ responses to two direct questions on wage spillovers asked in our survey. The first asked:
‘When the minimum wage was introduced did you have to increase the hourly rate of higher grade staff to maintain pay differentials?’ If
yes, the firms were then asked: ‘What percentage of the workforce which was above the minimum wage received an increase in hourly pay
rates as a result of restoring pay differentials?’
reported having workers affected by the legislation in 2000 and that
would not have raised wages were it not for the legislation. We refer
to these latter firms as ‘Effective Minimum Wage Firms’. The large
differences between the mean and median figures, within a group,
reflect the fact that employment in these firms is highly skewed to
the right. Comparing employment levels over time reveals substan-
tial employment growth for the first two classes of firms, with much
more modest growth for the affected firms.
Before looking at these employment changes in more detail,
Panel B of Table 5 highlights some of the other differences between
the affected firms and the other firms in the sample. The table 
classifies firms by other measures likely to be associated with exposure
to the minimum wage legislation. These include the proportion of
firms with at least one worker earning less than IR£4.00 in 1998;
the average number of workers affected by the legislation in 2000;
the proportion of workers currently being paid at or below the
minimum wage (a spike measure commonly used in minimum wage
studies); the increase in the wage bill associated with the minimum
wage; and the probability and extent of wage spillovers as a result
of the minimum wage legislation.12 Firms that would not have
increased wages in the absence of the legislation had a greater
number of workers actually affected by the legislation. They also
had a larger proportion of their current workforce located at or
below the minimum wage and had larger increases in their wage bill
as a result of the minimum wage. We can also examine the issue of
wage spillovers higher up the distribution using the spillover ques-
tions discussed above. The last two rows of Table 5 summarize
responses to these questions. Firms that reported being most
affected by the legislation were 60 per cent more likely to be affected
by spillovers and, once affected, also had to raise wages for a larger
proportion of the non-minimum wage workforce. All of these com-
parisons reinforce our maintained hypothesis that the firms that we
identify as ‘Effective Minimum Wage Firms’ are precisely those
firms most affected by the legislation.
To examine the employment effects of the legislation on these
firms we re-estimated equation [1] using the redefined measure of
the minimum wage bite. The results from this analysis are presented
in the first column of Table 6.13 None of the estimates on the control
variables change much as a result of redefining the minimum wage
variable. However, there is a striking change in the estimated
minimum wage effect. Whereas in previous specifications the
minimum wage variable was small and insignificant, it is now 
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statistically significant and negative: firms that had workers sub-
jected to the minimum wage legislation and that would not have
increased their wages fully were it not for the legislation have signi-
ficantly smaller increases in employment than other firms. For
instance, the median regression suggests that on average the growth
rate in employment was 19 percentage points less in the affected
firms than it was in the other firms.
This is the first evidence we find of a negative minimum wage
effect. It is important to realize that when we restrict attention to
firms that have valid data on each of the control variables we are
left with relatively few firms that report that they were affected by
the legislation, as we have defined it. In this context it is essential
that we examine the robustness of our findings. We check the
robustness of our results using two alternative estimators. Firstly,
we re-estimate the model using a median regression estimator,
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Table 6. The impact of the minimum wage on employment using a self-
reported measure of minimum wage (dependent variable —
percentage change in employment from 1998 to 2000; standard
errors appear in parentheses)
(2) Median (3) Robust 
Explanatory variable (1) OLSa regressionb regression
Constant 0.28* 0.07 0.08
(0.15) (0.05) (0.07)
EffectiveMW -0.29** -0.19** -0.20**
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
Irish -0.11 -0.05 -0.04
(0.11) (0.04) (0.05)
Export 0.007 0.01 0.002
(0.07) (0.02) (0.03)
Profit 0.1 0.09** 0.06
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
Union -0.02 -0.08** -0.02
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Wage Bill -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
TotEmp99 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sample size 444 444 444
Notes: * Significant at the 10 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level.
a t-stats based on White’s robust standard errors.
b t-stats calculated using bootstrap procedure.
rather than OLS. As the median estimator minimizes the sum of
the absolute value of the residuals it is less sensitive to outliers than
the OLS estimator. Secondly, we use the two-stage robust estimator
suggested by Li (1985). The results of the median regression are
given in the second column of Table 6, while the results of the
robust regression are given in the third column. The results from
both these approaches are very similar: although these estimators
cause the minimum wage estimate to fall, the significantly negative
effect identified in the linear regression model is still apparent even
when we control for outliers.
If we are to be confident about these estimates it is important we
know that the effect that we are measuring captures a response to
the minimum wage and not some other shock. We noted in Table 5
that the firms classified as minimum wage firms were also more
likely to exhibit greater response to the minimum wage in terms of
the direct wage bill and spillovers. However, using this self-reported
measure of minimum wage bite may not be valid if there is a re-
lationship between employment changes and a firm’s willingness 
to increase wages irrespective of any minimum wage legislation.
Perhaps the estimator is simply picking up the fact that firms that
perform poorly are more likely to be low wage and also constrained
when it comes to increasing wages; or that firms that performed
poorly are simply using the minimum wage as an ex post justifica-
tion of their failures. A traditional approach to correcting for this
type of problem would be to instrument the minimum wage vari-
able. However, it is difficult to construct satisfactory instruments in
this example — that is a variable that is correlated with the self-
reported minimum wage bite but uncorrelated with the unobserved
measures affecting a firm’s performance. We therefore seek an alter-
native approach. If our redefined minimum wage variable is simply
a proxy for firms with poor ‘employment-creating characteristics’
or firms that performed poorly for reasons other than the minimum
wage then we might expect to see these firms perform poorly even
in periods where there was no minimum wage legislation. Since the
employment records in our survey are limited to two observations,
one before and one after the minimum wage legislation, we cannot
calculate actual employment changes for the firms in other periods.
However, in the first wave of our survey we did ask firms to record
‘if compared to the same period in 1997 their labour force had
increased, stayed the same or fallen’. This provides us with a self-
reported measure of employment changes from 1997 to 1998, 2
years prior to the minimum wage legislation. If the self-reported
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minimum wage variable is proxying for firms with unfavourable
unobserved characteristics then we should expect to see these firms
also experiencing relative employment falls in this period also. To
determine whether this is so we constructed a binary variable taking
the value 1 if employment fell between 1997 and 1998 and zero 
otherwise. We then estimated the relationship between this binary
measure of employment change and the self-reported minimum
wage bite from the second wave of the survey. The results are pre-
sented in column (1) of Table 7. While the self-reported minimum
wage variable does increase the probability of observing employ-
ment declines from 1997 to 1998, it is not statistically significant:
employment growth in earlier years, for firms that said they would
not have increased wages were it not for the minimum wage, is not
significantly different from that of other firms.
One could argue that using the binary measure of employment
changes reduces the variation in the employment variable and that
this is responsible for the insignificant effect in the earlier period.
To check this we created a similar binary indicator for the
1998–2000 employment changes and re-estimated the minimum
wage equation using this as the dependent variable. The results are
given in column (2) of Table 7. The results clearly show that, even
when a binary indicator of employment decline is used to measure
employment changes, the self-reported minimum wage bite signifi-
cantly increases the probability of observing an employment decline
after the legislation. Part of the differences between the results in
the two periods reflects the relatively large standard error in the
earlier period. Nevertheless, while acknowledging the coefficient in
the first model is estimated imprecisely, the estimated coefficient in
the later period is over twice as large as that estimated for the period
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Table 7. The relationship between self-reported minimum wage bite and
employment changes for 1997/98 and 1998–2000 (standard
errors appear in parentheses)
Explanatory variable (1) 1997/98 (2) 1998–2000
Constant -1.38** -0.54**
(0.08) (0.06)
EffectiveMW 0.35 0.67**
(0.35) (0.29)
Sample size 574 574
* Significant at the 10 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level.
without the legislation. Although these results do not provide a
definitive case for our measure, the fact that the pre-legislation
effects of our redefined minimum wage variable are statistically
insignificant and much smaller in magnitude than the later effects
is at least consistent with the view that our measure is more than
just a proxy for unobserved firm-level characteristics.14
A final important check as to the appropriate interpretation of
our minimum wage estimate can be based on the change in output
prices that occurred over this time. If these firms were simply using
the minimum wage as an ex post rationalization for poor employ-
ment growth, arising from falling demand, then we would expect
output prices to fall relative to those in other firms, as the relative
demand curve shifts in. However, when asked in the survey what
happened to output prices over this period, firms affected by the
minimum wage were more likely to indicate that output prices had
risen. This is consistent with a shift in the industry supply curve due
to increased costs (such as the minimum wage) rather than a reduc-
tion in demand. Thus while we are conscious of the potential limi-
tations of our effective minimum wage measure, the fact that the
firms we identify correspond to those most affected by the legisla-
tion using a number of more traditional measures of minimum
wage bite; that their employment behaviour prior to the legislation
was not significantly different from that of the control group; and
perhaps most convincingly that output prices for these firms
increased rather than declined over this period, all support the view
that the employment effects we identify are minimum wage effects
and not an ex post rationalization of poor performance by the
firms.15
A final estimate of the impact of the minimum wage legislation
on employment levels can be obtained directly from firms’ responses
to a question we asked in the second wave of the survey. The ques-
tion was as follows:
Q.36 Suppose the minimum wage had not been introduced. Do you
think you would be employing: more people today than you
are; the same number of people or fewer people?
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More people . . . . . ❑1 Same number . . . . .❑2 Fewer people . . . . ❑3
Q.37 About how many more/fewer?__________people
Approximately 30 per cent of affected firms answered this ques-
tion positively. This provides some additional evidence of a nega-
tive employment effect. The average increase in employment across
all these firms is approximately 6 per cent of their current work-
force, which is somewhat lower than the 19 per cent estimate
obtained from the earlier analysis.
To understand the implications of our analysis we use our data
to estimate labour demand elasticities. To do this we need to know
the percentage change in employment for the affected minimum
wage firms as a result of the legislation (aN), along with the per-
centage increase in wages associated with the legislation (aw). The
elasticity of demand can then be calculated as aN/aw.16 Using
firms’ direct responses to the minimum wage question we obtain
a reduction in employment (aN) of 6 per cent. In order to estimate
the labour demand elasticity we also need a measure of the wage
change induced by the minimum wage. Machin et al. (2003) esti-
mate this effect using a linear regression where the change in
average wages in each firm is regressed on a measure of the
minimum wage. Unfortunately, as noted above, the structure of
our wage data makes it difficult to adopt this approach. One alter-
native we can use is to take the average response of our firms to
the question in the second wave asking ‘By approximately what
percentage did the minimum wage directly increase your labour
costs?’ When this is adjusted for wage spillovers we find an esti-
mated wage effect (aw) of 12 per cent. Combining our estimates 
of aN and aw we therefore get an estimated labour demand elas-
ticity of -0.5. This estimate is certainly within the range of previ-
ous estimates of labour demand elasticities (Hamermesh, 1993,
Ch. 3) and is quite close to the average estimates that tend to 
lie in the range of [-0.6, -0.9] and to the estimates reported 
by Machin et al. (2003) of [-0.15, -0.55]. Indeed, in a recent survey
carried out by Fuchs et al. (1998) a number of labour economists
were asked to provide their best guess of the total wage elasticity
of labour demand. The average (median) guess equalled -0.63 
(-0.50). On the other hand, there are reasons as to why we might
have expected our estimate to be higher than these traditional 
estimates. Firstly, the employment estimate is based directly 
on employers’ responses to a minimum wage question, which is
likely to be an upper bound on the employment effect. Secondly,
our experiment is driven by reductions in the price of unskilled
labour, which traditionally tends to have relatively high elasticities.
Taking these into account one might reasonably conclude that 
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our estimates indicate a relatively modest negative response of
labour demand to changes in wages arising from minimum wage
legislation.17
4. Conclusion
This paper provides the first evaluation of the labour market con-
sequences of the NMW introduced in Ireland in April 2000. To do
this we use a panel survey of firms that were contacted both before
and after the minimum wage was introduced, to obtain information
on work practices and employment structure. Initial results show
that employment growth among firms with low-wage workers, prior
to the legislation, was not significantly different from that of firms
not affected by the legislation. This is consistent with recent studies
that have argued that minimum wages seem to have no adverse
effects on employment. However, it has been recognized for some
time now that counts of workers below the minimum wage (even
when adjusted for distance from the minimum wage) may be an
unsatisfactory measure of the bite of the minimum wage. Some
workers initially below the minimum wage are likely to have their
wages increased over time irrespective of the legislation. It seems
incorrect to include these workers in the treatment group when
looking at the effects of the legislation. This is likely to be a par-
ticular problem in Ireland, where wages increased significantly in
the years prior to the legislation, and suggests that a partial explan-
ation for the complete absence of a minimum wage effect in these
data may be that so few firms were affected by the legislation. To
allow for this we redefined the minimum wage variable to include
only firms that had low-wage workers and that stated that they would
not have increased wages by as much were it not for the minimum wage
legislation. When we used this redefined measure of the minimum
wage bite we found the negative employment and hours effects pre-
dicted by the competitive model of the labour market. Further
analysis suggests that this result is not driven by unobserved firm-
level characteristics associated with employment growth and self-
reported wage restraint. Although there is evidence of employment
losses among the small number of firms most severely affected by
the legislation, the estimated elasticity of labour demand is rela-
tively modest in size, especially given the relatively low skill levels
of the workers involved.
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Data appendix
Variable definitions
Deltaemp: percentage change in employment between 1998 and
2000.
Irish: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company
was Irish owned.
Export: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company
exported any part of its output.
Profit: a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company
reported a profit for the previous year.
Union: dummy variable taking the value 1 if more than 50
per cent of the firm’s non-managerial employees were
members of a trade union.
Wage Bill: labour costs as a percentage of total costs.
TotEmp98: firm employment level in 1998.
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Table A1. Classification of private-sector employees by pay range
% of full-time % of part-time 
Pay range % of all workers workers workers
Less than IR£4.50 21 14 64
IR£4.50–5.49 16 16 18
IR£5.50–6.49 17 17 10
More than IR£6.50 46 53 8
Table A2. Classification of the low paid by pay range, private-sector
employees
% of all earning 
Pay range % of the population less than IR£4.50
IR£4.00–4.50 12.6 60.0
IR£3.00–3.99 6.9 32.8
Less than IR£3.00 an hour 1.5 7.2
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Table A3. Classification of private-sector employees by gender
% all % falling below % of all those 
Gender employees IR£4.50 below IR£4.50
Male 60.1 15.0 43.0
Female 39.9 30.4 57.0
Table A4. Age classification of private-sector employees
% of all % falling below % of all those 
Age group employees IR£4.50 below IR£4.50
Aged 18 or less 4.8 80.4 18.3
Aged 19–25 29.1 34.2 47.3
Aged 26 or more 66.1 11 34.4
Table A5. Occupational classification of private-sector employees
% of all % below % of all those 
Occupation employees IR£4.50 below IR£4.50
Managers/proprietors 15.7 4.5 3.3
Engineering/science/computer/ 6.2 0.6 0.1
other professionals
Engineering/science and 3.8 1.1 0.2
computer technicians
Clerical/secretarial 13.7 7.5 4.9
Skilled maintenance/skilled 10.1 14.6 7
production
Production operatives 17.1 20.8 16.9
Transport and 5.9 8.2 2.3
communications
Sales 13.3 49.7 31.4
Personal services 18.1 63.6 24.4
Labourers 6.1 32.5 9.4
Notes
1 The data we use were collected by the survey unit of the Economic and 
Social Research Institute. Copies of the questionnaires are available at
<http://www.nuim.ie/academic/economics/Donal/MWAGE.html>.
2 It is important to recognize that the surveys looked at employment practices in
Ireland in general. Firms were not asked directly about the minimum wage until
the final page of the first survey.
3 Response rates in the order of 50 per cent are quite common in firm-level studies.
4 The 458 firms that appear only in the second wave were used in a separate study
characterizing the Irish labour market. They do not enter the analysis presented
in this paper.
5 This implies a closure rate of approximately 5 per cent. In addition to these 50
firms, we can identify another 106 firms that no longer operated at the original
address. It is possible that some of these firms may have gone out of business.
Including all of these additional firms as closures gives an upper bound for the
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Table A6. Industry breakdown of private-sector employees
% of all % below % of all those
Sector employees IR£4.50 below IR£4.50
Building and construction 7.7 9.1 3.3
Manufacture of textiles and apparel 2.0 33.2 3.3
Other manufacturing and production 25.8 9.7 11.8
Retail 17.0 38.8 31.3
Wholesale 5.1 22.5 5.5
Prop/rent/business services 16.4 10.7 8.3
Hotels/restaurants/bars 11.1 49.3 26
Personal and other services 14.9 14.9 10.5
Table A7. Summary statistics of firm characteristics across the original
sample and the matched sample
Variable name Mean (MS) SD (MS) Mean (FS) SD (FS)
Deltaemp 0.18 0.65 NA NA
Irish 0.89 0.31 0.88 0.32
Export 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47
Profit 0.77 0.43 0.73 0.44
Union 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41
Wage Bill 0.35 0.19 0.35 0.19
TotEmp98 69 192 67 179
Notes: MS: matched sample; FS: full sample.
closure rate of 14.6 per cent. Data provided by Forfas (an agency responsible for
the promotion of industrial development in Ireland) indicates that the official
closure rate of this period was 13.6 per cent: this lies between our two estimates.
When analysing the closure rate we include only the 50 firms that were actually
identified as having closed down. The results do not change if we include the other
106 firms in our analysis as additional closures.
6 For example, Neumark and Wascher (2000) suggest that the employment data
from Card and Krueger’s survey of fast-food establishments may contain signifi-
cant measurement error. See Card and Krueger (2000) for a reply.
7 We should note that if the measurement error in employment is not of the classi-
cal form then the test suggested by Neumark and Wascher is no longer valid.
8 While we had significant control over the design of the survey, the implemen-
tation of the minimum wage itself was a sensitive issue that was carried out at 
government level. Thus it was not possible for us, as some have suggested, to alter
the mechanism by which the minimum wage was introduced.
9 Total non-agricultural employment in Ireland over this same period increased
from 1.4 million to 1.58 million, an increase of approximately 13 per cent 
(Quarterly National Household Survey, First Quarter 2001, <http://www.cso.ie/
releasespublications/documents/labour_market/2001/qnhs_qtr12001.pdf>).
10 The use of these controls accounts for the fall in sample size from 587 to 451.
For ease of comparison the results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 are based on
the smaller sample. The results in column (1) are very similar if the full sample of
587 is used.
11 The low R2 reported in our regressions is typical of micro-studies of employ-
ment changes. For example, Machin et al. (2003) report a maximum R2 of 0.15 for
their employment change regression even after including individual- and firm-level
characteristics. There are some variables in our data that do a better job of explain-
ing employment fluctuations, such as the trend in sales over this same period. This
variable is highly significant when included in the employment regression.
However, our goal is to isolate the impact of the minimum wage on employment
changes. Since part of this effect may work through a reduction in output (scale
effect) we do not include the sales variable in the regression.
12 For a more detailed discussion of the range of impact measures that have been
used to estimate the impact of a NMW, see Lemos (2002).
13 A small number of firms did not provide the information needed to construct
EffectiveMW. As a result, the sample size falls further: from 451 to 444.
14 We have also estimated the employment equations in Table 3 including the
binary measure of employment change in the earlier period as a control variable.
This had only a small effect on the estimated coefficients, with the estimated mean
employment effect changing from -0.29 to -0.28 and the median effect moving
from -0.19 to -0.17.
15 As a final sensitivity check we restricted the analysis only to firms that said
they would not have increased wages without the legislation. For these firms we
can use variations in the proportion of the workforce that is low paid to identify
the minimum wage effect. This analysis again reveals a negative relationship
between employment changes and the bite of the minimum wage for those firms
that were directly affected. Since this analysis is based only on those firms that we
have classified as ‘effective minimum wage firms’, this relationship is purged of any
ex post justification that may have affected the earlier results. Again, however, we
must be wary of the small sizes involved in this latter analysis.
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16 As noted by Machin et al. (2003, p. 173), this is analogous to using the
minimum wage as an instrument in a first-stage wage regression of a structural
model of the labour market.
17 Further support for our finding that the minimum wage did not have a major
effect on labour market outcomes over this period can be found in surveys carried
out by the Small Firms Association (SFA), traditionally one of the greatest oppo-
nents of the minimum wage in Ireland. In these surveys the SFA ask its members
to rank the problems facing small firms in Ireland at the time of the survey. It is
interesting to note that in 2002 (2 years after the introduction of the minimum
wage), the SFA did not deem it necessary to include a question concerning the
minimum wage in its list of potential problems. A year later, in 2003, by which
time the minimum wage had increased to €6.35, the minimum wage was included
specifically as one of the potential problems but was ranked last in terms of impor-
tance by firms, below concerns such as traffic, red tape, and late payment from
debtors (http://waterfordchamber.com/KieranCrowley). As an aside, insurance
costs were ranked as the most important barrier facing firms in each of the most
recent years.
References
Brown C. (1999) ‘Minimum Wages, Employment and the Distribution of Income’
in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Card D. and Kreuger A. (1995) Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of
the Minimum Wage, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Card, D. and Kreuger A. (2000) ‘Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case 
Study of the Fast-food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply’,
American Economic Review 90(5): 1397–1420.
Deere D., Murphy K. and Welch F. (1996) ‘Examining the Evidence on Minimum
Wages and Employment’ in Kosters M. (ed.) The Effects of the Minimum
Wage on Employment, Washington, DC: AEI Press: 26–54.
Dickens R. and Manning A. (2004a) ‘Has the National Minimum Wage Reduced
UK Wage Inequality?’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (Series A)
167(4): 613–626.
Dickens R. and Manning A. (2004b) ‘Spikes and Spill-overs: The Impact of the
National Minimum Wage on the Wage Distribution in a Low Wage Sector’,
Economic Journal 114(494): C95–C101.
Dickens R., Machin S. and Manning A. (1999) ‘The Effects of Minimum Wages
on Employment: Theory and Evidence from Britain’, Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 17: 1–22.
Fuchs V., Krueger A. and Poterba J. (1998) ‘Economists’ Views about Parameters,
Values and Policies: Some Survey Results in Labor and Public Economics’,
Journal of Economic Literature XXXVI(3): 1387–1425.
Hamermesh D. (1993) Labor Demand, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lemos S. (2002) ‘The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Wages and Employment 
in Brazil — A Menu of Minimum Wage Variables’, Working Paper No.
02-02, University College London.
Li G. (1985) ‘Robust Regression’ in Hoaglin D., Mosteller F. and Tukey J. (eds.)
Exploring Data Tables, Trends and Shapes, New York: John Wiley.
Evaluating the Introduction of a National Minimum Wage 89
© 2006 The Authors
Journal compilation © CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
Machin S. and Manning A. (1994) ‘Minimum Wages, Wage Dispersion and
Employment: Evidence from the UK Wages Council’, Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 47: 319–329.
Machin S. and Manning A. (1996) ‘Employment and the Introduction of a
Minimum Wage in Britain’, Economic Journal 106: 667–676.
Machin S. and Wilson J. (2004) ‘Minimum Wages in a Low-wage Labour Market:
Care Homes in the UK’, Economic Journal 114(494): C102–C108.
Machin S., Manning A. and Rahman L. (2003) ‘Where the Minimum Wage Bites
Hard: The Introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage to a Low
Wage Sector’, Journal of the European Economic Association 1(1): 154–180.
Neumark D. and Wascher W. (2000) ‘Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case
Study of the Fast-food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania:
Comment’, American Economic Review 90(5): 1362–1396.
Report of the National Minimum Wage Commission (1998) Dublin: Government
Publications Sale Office.
Stewart M. (2004) ‘The Employment Effects of the National Minimum Wage’,
Economic Journal 114(494): C110–C116.
Teulings C. (2000) ‘The Contribution of Minimum Wages to Increasing Wage
Inequality’, Economic Journal 114(490): 801–833.
90 Donal O’Neill — Brian Nolan — James Williams
© 2006 The Authors
Journal compilation © CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
